The Philosophy of Mind (PHIL20033)
Undergraduate level 2Points: 12.5On Campus (Parkville)
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Semester 1
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This subject will cover central issues in the philosophy of mind, such as the relationship between minds and brains (e.g., dualism, behaviourism, physicalism, functionalism and eliminativism), the nature of mental states such as beliefs, desires and sensations, how mental states represent features of the world, and the relationship between the first-person perspective on oneself and the third-person scientific perspective on the mind.
Intended learning outcomes
Students who successfully complete this subject will:
- possess a broad knowledge and understanding of issues in the contemporary philosophy of mind, including an understanding of the major theories minds and mental states including dualism, behaviourism, identity theory, functionalism, eliminativism and interpretivism;
- engage critically with existing philosophical conversations about the nature of mental states and develop the capacity for critical and creative interventions in those discussions;
- discern the relevance of philosophical ideas about minds and mental states for practical and moral quesitons about whether which organisms or artificial systems have minds and are deserving of moral consideration;
- come to appreciate how empirical discoveries in psychology and neuroscience can challenge our common sense understanding of mental states and our ability to know about them;
- appreciate how issues in the philosophy of mind intersect with broader philosophical questions about metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language;
- demonstrate a high-level of fluency in communication and collaboration skills, including oral and written presentation of arguments and effective work in small and large groups;
- be prepared to engage with the possibility of radical critique of critique of their own suppositions and commitments about the nature of the mental.
Last updated: 14 March 2025